The Politicisation of Security

The Politicisation of Security: Controversy, Mobilisation, Arena Shifting

Introduction by the Guest Editors

Jonas Hagmann, Hendrik Hegemann and Andrew Neal

Introduction

Security is often seen as a special kind of politics, given its apparent tendency to close down public debate, rely on exclusive expert knowledge, and empower exceptional measures.[1] However, recent empirical developments have challenged these assumptions. There has always been periodically intense political activity around security, especially in relation to temporary spikes in public debates and clashes related to the use of military force, large-scale military spending or highly-publicised security and intelligence scandals. Yet, with the widening and deepening of what it means to speak 'security' and the increasing value that states and societies attach to the concept, security themes have become more prominent in a wide range of political activities and arenas, including the agendas of parliaments, courts, and NGOs. These have become more vividly debated by parties, civil society groups, newspapers and broadcasters, and are given increasingly polarised and viral spins on social media platforms. For example, parliaments in many countries have published reports and held inquiries on some of the more controversial aspects of the post-9/11 'war on terror', such as 'enhanced interrogation' or the 'blacklisting' of terrorist suspects. The revelations by Edward Snowden on mass surveillance by Western intelligence agencies led to intensive public debates. European courts at different levels have ruled against new laws for the retention of telecommunications data and the transfer of passenger name records. In the United States, President Trump's executive order of the 'Muslim travel ban' ignited intense public protests at airports and elsewhere. At the same time, many right-wing populist movements have also challenged security elites, arguing that security authorities were not doing enough, rather than too much. These latter usually demand even harsher security measures, including the targeting of minority groups. This is part of a broader

[1] Claudia Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation", *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 4 (2004): 388-413; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Jef Huysmans, *Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits* (London: Routledge, 2014); Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 481-502.

trend. Security has been a central and controversial concern in recent elections, including in Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and during the 'Brexit' referendum. Beyond such political drama, a growing range of diverse actors now deal with security on a regular basis, for example in parliamentary committee work or public consultation processes, thereby resembling familiar patterns of 'normal' democratic politics seen in other policy-fields.

These observations go against the accepted scholarly understanding that security is necessarily a domain of sovereign decision, professional prerogative or control technology that marginalises more 'normal' forms of (democratic) politics. Earlier research in Political Science and Public Policy had occasionally flagged up the potential link between security and wider political debates and processes, such as the extent of parliamentary control on military deployments,[2] the influence of public opinion and protests during the Cold War,[3] or the local, national and international political economies of defence procurement.[4] However, these debates remained marginal, and studies tended to focus on 'traditional' issues of national security and did not engage with wider conceptual discussions about 'security' and its political effects. Among security studies researchers there is a strong understanding that, generally speaking, security narratives have powerful effects on political and social life; weighing the normative components of observed security politics, many contemporary security scholars equate security with inevitable constraints on democratic politics, public debate and political struggle.[5] In this sense, security as a dominant framing is, by and large, considered a problem for, or even removed from, democratic politics. As a consequence of this scholarly view, surprisingly few studies exist today on how security articulations are or can be contested, engaged across different political arenas, and taken up by diverse political actors, such as courts, parliaments, NGOs and individual political leaders.[6] Taking a cue from empirical developments and focusing on European contexts, this special issue seeks to draw attention to a broader universe of actors, arguments and arenas of security politics that extend beyond securitised exceptions,

---

[2] William G. Howell and John C. Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers, (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[3] Paul Burstein and William Freudenberg, "Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Antiwar Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions", *American Journal of Sociology* 84, no. 11 (1978): 99-122.

[4] Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, "Public Opinion and the Common Defence: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?", *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 4 (1992): 905-915.

[5] Buzan et al., *Security*; Ole Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory", *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 465-80; Huysmans, Security Unbound; Michael Williams, "Securitization as Political Theory: The Politics of the Extraordinary", *International Relations* 29, no. 1 (2015): 114-120.

[6] For one exception see Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics* (London: Routledge, 2014).

technocratic risk management or executive prerogatives. Rather than focusing on the diverse ways in which security limits politics, the contributors address the varied forms and modes of politics that increasingly emerge in and around security. Instead of looking at security as closure, we propose an understanding of security as a field of political activity occupied by diverse actors mobilised in different kinds of struggles, and in which political conflicts can shift across arenas. Seen this way, political closure might be one possible outcome, but it should not simply be presumed and taken for granted.

In order to capture a broader range of political controversy, activity, and actors linked to security, this special issue suggests using the conceptual vocabulary of *politicisation*, rather than traditional security studies concepts such as securitisation, governmentality or control. In so doing, it connects security studies to political studies literatures often ignored by the subfield – especially research on politicisation and de-politicisation in liberal democracies[7] and on the politicisation of international institutions and European governance[8] – and explores their utility for analysing current security-related political phenomena. Taken together, the politicisation perspective advanced by this special issue thus endeavours to make three contributions to current theoretical, empirical and normative debates on security politics: *First*, it seeks to reopen conceptual questions about the relationship between security and politics. Acknowledging the historical legacy of 'security' as domain of sovereign decision, influential critiques of national security as a tool of social and political exclusion, and the expansion of security governance technologies and expertise, it foregrounds overlooked developments of increasing and diversifying political activity around security. Rather than starting from security studies perspectives emphasising the marginalisation of politics by security, it points to the literature on politicisation as alternative vantage points for analysing recent dynamics in the security field. *Second*, it aims to empower original and contextualising empirical work. Apart

[7] Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller, "Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools", *British Politics* 1 no. 3 (2006): 293-318; Colin Hay, Why We Hate *Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)*;* Matthew Wood, "Politicisation, Depoliticisation and Anti-politics: Towards a Multilevel Research Agenda", *Political Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2016): 521-533.

[8] Pieter de Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration", *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 5 (2011): 559-75; Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold and Henning Schmidtke, "Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance", *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22; Edgar Grande and Swen Hutter, "Introduction: European Integration and the Challenge of Politicisation", in *Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics*, eds. Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3-31; Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Politicization of European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (Annual Review 2016): 32-47; Michael Zürn, "The Politicization of World Politics and its Effects: Eight Propositions", *European Political Science Review* 6, no. 1 (2014): 47-71.

from the question of whether security is politicised or not, we need to understand when, why, how and by whom security is made more controversial, opened to debate by different actors, and shifted to different political arenas. *Third,* the politicisation perspective seeks to de-centre the focus from an *a priori* view on security as a loss of democratic ideals; ideals that are often presupposed and yearned for, but whose precise past and potential configurations are rarely investigated in detail (and are sometimes quite romanticised). Rather, it calls for more differentiated inquiries into the ambivalent consequences and normative implications of politicisation in its different guises, which cannot simply be presumed to be a normatively preferable option.

To these aims, the introduction first summarises existing arguments that tend to associate security with depoliticisation. It then draws on different approaches from political science to develop a framework for the study of politicisation in the security field emphasising three aspects: *controversiality*, *mobilisation*, and *arena-shifting*. These dimensions are illustrated with brief case studies on public controversies surrounding the revelations by Edward Snowden, the mobilisation of lay publics in the making of national security strategies, and parliaments as an arena of 'normal' security politics. The introduction concludes with a short preview of the special issue's six research articles and their contributions to the analysis of security and politics.

Security versus Politics: The Depoliticisation Argument

Contemporary security analysis often links security to strategies of depoliticisation. Depoliticisation essentially refers to processes that seek to deny the political character of a topic and move the issue out of the realm of contingent and controversial discussion.[9] Depoliticisation itself is a deeply political act that can be contested and reversed, but, if established as a dominant narrative, can shape and constrain the political process. Though security has always been political, it is often seen as placing a constraint on democratic politics that stifles public debate and political contestation and limits the range of legitimate arenas, actors and arguments. Jef Huysmans, a leading contemporary security studies scholar, goes as far as defining the very

[9] Peter Burnham, "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2001), 128; Hay, Politics, 79-80.

essence of security as 'techniques enacting democratic limits'.[10] Security in this sense is linked to depoliticisation – which in the specialised literatures comes in different variants, or traditions.

The most deeply engrained view in this regard is represented by theories of self-proclaimed 'realism'. Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* had already cast a shadow over the security concept and its field of practice, placing sovereign guarantees of existential security as fundamentally prior to other human concerns, including politics. Even today, this is reflected in the disciplinary heritage of the concept of security, which is more at home in the field of International Relations than in domestic or comparative politics. For much of the twentieth century, security in the 'realist' tradition was considered the domain of sovereign states and commanders-in-chief. Here, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international politics were not to be the realms of public debate, democratic deliberation, or political choice; they were too important for that. Martin Wight, for instance, suggested that 'International politics…is the field in which political action is most regularly necessitous',[11] and Max Weber maintained that 'foreign policy deliberations which are still in the balance…must be dealt with in a small committee protected by a guarantee of confidentiality'.[12]

This long-standing line of 'traditionalist' and 'realist' reasoning, according to which extraordinary politics dominates in the security realm, and security is a prerogative of the state in its attempt to guarantee national security and survival, is still present in contemporary security studies theorising – albeit for different reasons. Most famously maybe, the 'Copenhagen School' of securitisation argued that constructions of existential threat – if accepted by the target audience – can legitimate extraordinary measures and shield them from public scrutiny and deliberation. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde famously defined acts of securitisation as 'the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or as above politics'.[13] Hence, invocations of security enact a specific logic of exception and urgency in politics that favours speedy decision-making, strengthens governmental authority and impedes open resistance.[14] Driven by securitising actors and operating mainly through the power of language, security

[10] Huysmans, *Security Unbound, 13.*
[11] Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?", in: *International Theory: Critical Investigations,* ed. James der Derian (London: Macmillan, 1995), 26.
[12] Max Weber, "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order", in: *Weber: Political* Writings, eds. Max Weber, Peter Lassmann and Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 185-6.
[13] Buzan et al., *Security*, 23.
[14] Williams, "Securitization".

articulations are thus principally at odds with democratic politics.[15] In foundational 'realist' and 'Copenhagen' understandings alike, security is thus prior to politics in the sense of being its condition of possibility, above politics in the sense of the *Leviathan* towering above the realm, and beyond politics in the sense of being international and not domestic. Security of course remains political, but it is prior, above, and beyond the 'low' politics of non-existential matters.

However, this statist model of security has been subjected to important criticism. In 1992, arguing from a feminist perspective, J. Ann Tickner pointed out that 'national security often takes precedence over the social security of individuals'.[16] David Campbell, and others influenced by post-structuralism, argued that far from simply defending the 'nation' against foreign enemies, such strategies also 'operated as a means of domesticating the (US) self' and as an 'intolerance for ambiguity at all levels of social life from neighbourhoods to the international order'.[17] Such critiques and the search for ethico-political alternatives have found a long and productive life in feminist and critical security studies. These critiques are themselves a form of politicisation, highlighting the deleterious and marginalising political effects of security policies and practices with a view to encouraging alternatives. But while this is a long-established move in critical security studies, our point of departure is that this argument needs readdressing in order to note the flourishing of political activities around security that belie the assumption of depoliticisation.

This also applies to more recent scholarship focusing on security 'governance' and politics beyond the domain of sovereign decision and international affairs. Scholars in Critical Security Studies and International Political Sociology especially have mapped out and theorised the expansion of security governance as a field of technology and expertise along the domestic/international distinction. 'Security' in this sense is not a constraint of politics through dramatic speech acts and exceptional measures, but rather through mundane yet inaccessible bureaucratic routines in the management of everyday insecurity and diffuse risks. These are spurred by the new reliance on modern data capture technologies and transnational information exchange, i.e. high degrees of professionalisation and executive inter-agency cooperation

[15] Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene"; Lene Hansen, "Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It", *Review of International Studies* 38 , no. 4 (2011): 525-546.
[16] J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press), 28.
[17] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 270, 277.

across borders and a wide range of themes.[18] Under these conditions, political conflict and debate are limited to behind-the-scenes considerations between hard-to-find 'security professionals' of all sorts, who enjoy special authority and whose knowledge production and negotiation practices are difficult to read and challenge by lay persons.[19] Moreover, security is at times also portrayed as disempowering by virtue of its 'technological operation'. In the view of control scholars especially, modern security instruments such as CCTV cameras, sensors, databases or classification algorithms are found to act on society, not in dialogue with it.[20] Security seen this way works in 'gazing' and machine-like ways, imposing itself on the body politic. Designed environments, programmed machines and installed technologies normalise societal behaviour in ways that are difficult to escape or even detect, and almost impossible to speak back to.[21]

Scholars have analysed the rise of security technologies such as visa databases, online tracking and surveillance systems, algorithmic risk management, and border regimes when making these claims. Much like the feminist and post-structuralist critiques mentioned earlier, these scholars and cases continue to convey concerns about the priority of security over politics. Didier Bigo, for example, writes that this growing field of security professionals has simply 'discarded some actors, like parliaments'.[22] Jonas Hagmann and Myriam Dunn-Cavelty, writing about the rise of science-oriented 'national risk registers', argue that they 'foreclose the possibility of contestation and discount alternative views'.[23] Similarly, Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster suggest that risk governance technologies do not 'lead to a democratic politics that debates what is to be done, but to intensified efforts and technological inventions on the part of the risk managers'.[24] Again, while these critiques of technological and professional security developments attempt to repoliticise them, they can and often do overlook

[18] Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease", Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27 (2002): 64-92.
[19] Trine Villumsen Berling, "Science and Securitization: Objectivation, the Authority of the Speaker and Mobilization of Scientific Facts", *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 385-397; Jonas Hagmann and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, "National Risk Registers: Security Scientism and the Propagation of Permanent Insecurity", *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 1 (2012): 80-97.
[20] Jonas Hagmann, "Security in the Society of Control: The Politics and Practices of Securing Urban Spaces", *International Political Sociology* 11, no. 4 (2017): 418-448; Michael Hardt, "The Global Society of Control", *Discourse* 20, no. 3 (1998): 139-152.
[21] David Lyon, *Surveillance after Snowden* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Jef Huysmans, "Democratic Curiosity in Times of surveillance. *European Journal of International Security* 1(1): 73-93.
[22] Bigo, "Security", 83.
[23] Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, "Risk Registers", 81.
[24] Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, "Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future, *European Journal o f International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 108.

the proliferation of political actors and activities that are already doing so, such as the cyber activists increasingly mobilised against electronic state surveillance practices.

By 'security' then, we refer to three dimensions of specialised thinking and practice, and note that they each convey deleterious implications for politics. First, we refer to the still-powerful historical and conceptual legacy that posits the sovereign state guarantee of 'security' as the necessary condition for social, political, and economic life. This is often associated with 'hard' security issues such as war, secret intelligence, and military affairs.[25] Second, we refer to 'security' as a site of contest and political struggle, because for at least three decades the paradigm of 'national security' has been criticised for not addressing and even exacerbating the insecurities of vulnerable groups, such as women and minorities, and those whose basic human needs are not met by prevailing socio-economic conditions.[26] And third, we refer to security as a growing field of governance practices that are increasingly bureaucratised, decentralised, privatised, and technologised, which spill beyond traditional foreign security policy and into the myriad social interactions and economic transactions that permeate globalised life.[27] Common to all three themes, we find, is an assumption (in the first case) or an anxiety (in the second and third) that 'security' trumps 'politics' because of its existential priority, institutional predominance and lengthening technological tendrils.

Our thumbnail sketches of existing current security studies arguments only scratch the surface of by now much wider and more complex scholarly debates. However, they do illustrate that despite their differences, major traditions in contemporary security studies share a basic emphasis on the depoliticising effects of security. There has been a move towards more refined contextualisation of the things security 'does' politically, i.e., wider acknowledgement that 'security does different things at different times and in different places'.[28] Also, there has been a move towards understanding its mechanism of enactment and reproduction in more dialectical

---

[25] Patrick A. Mello and Dirk Peters, "Parliaments in Security Policy: Involvement, Politicisation, and Influence", *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 1 (2018), 5; see also: Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991), 211-39.

[26] Christopher S. Browning and Matt McDonald, "The Future of Critical Security Studies. Ethics and the Politics of Security", *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 2 (2013), 242; Heidi Hudson, "Doing Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Security", *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 2 (2005): 155-74.

[27] Marieke de Goede, *Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Money* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[28] Browning and McDonald, "Critical Security Studies", 242; see also: Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agenda, Audience and Context", European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201..

and contingent ways.[29] Yet while the second and third of these strands have explicitly sought to (re)politicise the depoliticisations of security through critique, they have done so largely without consideration of the proliferating forms of political activity that surround security policy and practice. Most research still coalesces around the notion that discourses and practices of security 'are part of a disciplining power that constitutes a separation between security and the political, which severely constrains and limits the space of political contention'.[30]

Politics around Security: The Politicisation Perspective

This special issue does not suggest that the constraining (and unwarranted) effects of security on political debate and conflict described above do not exist. Yet, it argues that security politics should not be reduced to securitised exception, professional risk-management and technological control, which only cover parts of the various political activities around security in its different guises. Indeed, these framings make it difficult to address seemingly more recent observations such as public court activism, parliamentary efforts at (re-)claiming security affairs, or individual politicians' and governments' own attempts at politicising security topics. Instead of entangling itself in the now vast debate on the conceptual revision and methodological refinement of 'securitisation' or other established prime concepts in security studies, such as emancipation, exception, technocracy, governmentality or resilience, this special issue argues that *politicisation* offers an alternative and productive perspective to capture a range of recent phenomena in the security field that move beyond the understanding of security as depoliticisation.

Debates on politicisation and depoliticisation in Political Science and European Studies are particularly useful for carving out this alternative perspective. In Political Science, a range of scholars deal with forms of depoliticisation in the context of neoliberalism, post-democracy and anti-politics. Mostly located in the UK, their recent body of work conceptualises and tracks down processes of depoliticisation as well as counter-attempts at (re-)politicisation in this

[29] Jonas Hagmann, "Representations of Terrorism and the Making of Counterterrorism Policy", *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 3 (2013): 429-446; Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond", *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 357-383.
[30] Karen Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 5.

distinctive polity.[31] In International Relations and European Studies, by contrast, a strand of recent scholarship has come to focus on how the transfer of authority to international institutions, most notably the European Union, as well as the latter's increasing interference in domestic affairs and citizens' daily lives, has led to intensified societal interest and demands that put their legitimacy up for debate. The scholarship here has shown how this trend of societal politicisation questions established forms of functional legitimation, and challenges the alleged 'permissive consensus' among internationalist elites with ambivalent consequences for international cooperation, as is visible in protests during international summits, responses to the 'Eurocrisis' and indeed Brexit.[32]

What brings these two bodies of literature together is an understanding that politicisation accentuates the deliberation and contestation of alternative viewpoints in the public sphere, and that it can do so along different avenues, as multiple actors contribute to putting established assumptions up for debate. Politicisation in this sense opens up or expands the scope of political conflict to include a broader variety of actors, audiences and arguments. This follows a conflict-oriented understanding of politics that emphasises contingency and the struggle over collectively binding decisions. Politics, hence, is described as 'a generative, indeterminate process, which is inherently unstable, complex, value-laden, contested and, ultimately, concerned with agency'.[33] Politicisation is the process of transferring issues into the political sphere, but also the dynamic of reconfiguring its handling there. It moves issues from simple necessities to which there is no alternative to contingent and multi-faceted struggles over alternative options. It thereby creates space for political action.[34]

Politicisation is a useful concept for the study of the relationship between security and politics. It offers a vector for addressing the seemingly new, or now more visible, political activities around security described in the introduction, and refrain from making 'simple' dichotomous distinctions. This is because specific (de-) politicisation boosts can move an issue in either direction along a continuum, and in many cases different actors will try to move issues

[31] Burnham "Politics of Depoliticisation"; Paul Fawcett and David Marsh, "Depoliticisation, Governance and Political Participation", *Policy & Politics* 42**,** no. 2 (2014): 171-188; Flinders and Wood, "Depoliticisation"; Hay*, Politics*; Laura Jenkins, "The Difference Genealogy Makes: Strategies for Politicisation or How To Expand Capacities for Autonomy", *Political Studies* 59 no. 1 (2011); Bob Jessop, "Repoliticising Depoliticisation: Theoretical Preliminaries on Some Responses to the American Fiscal and Eurozone Debt Crises", *Policy & Politics* 42, no. 2 (2014): 207-23; Wood, "Politicisation".
[32] De Wilde "Politicization of European Integration"; de Wilde et al., "Differentiated Politicisation"; Grande and Hutter, "Introduction"; Kriesi, "Politicisation"; Zürn, "Politicization of World Politics".
[33] Jenkins, "Strategies for Politicisation", 159.
[34] Hay, *Politics*, 67.

in very different directions.[35] A politicisation perspective directs us to trace and unpack these very processes in order to understand how concrete actors advance their potentially conflicting arguments and interact in various arenas. Considering politicisation as 'a set of interrelated processes in which human interaction is central',[36] it opens up views on differentiated processes as they take form in different thematic, cultural and institutional contexts. In a sense, this special issue thereby picks up earlier research in Political Science and Public Policy that, as mentioned in the introduction, studied a range of political activities around security and defence policy. However, we focus more specifically on the processes through which security issues in a wider sense are made political and brought into the realm of controversial and contingent public debate and decision-making. In order to study the diverse manifestations of politicisation in the security field, we look to the aforementioned literature on the politicisation of international institutions, where authors often identify three interrelated (and sometimes also difficult to delineate) indicators to determine different kinds and degrees of politicisation: the level of polarisation and contestation across different actors and their opinions; the salience and visibility of an issue to the public; and the range and diversity of actors that is active and interested in the field.[37] Building upon this distinction, this special issue argues that politicisation processes in the security field entail changes at three distinct levels: issues becoming more divisive or controversial; actors becoming more aware and politically engaged; and the shifting of security themes and issues from executive secrecy or expert specialisms into more prominent public arenas.

Our first dimension of *controversy* stresses that politicisation is a contentious, interactive process in which various political actors make competing claims over which they struggle with the targets of their demands and broader audiences. Controversy increases when more diverse, conflicting or even extreme viewpoints on an issue find their way into public discourse and the growing distance between opinions held and voiced by various actors or groups becomes visible. It is, hence, a measure for the 'intensity of conflict'.[38] Respective empirical research, for example, traces changes in political polarisation as expressed in party platforms, media reporting, public opinion polls or parliamentary debates. In addition,

[35] Hendrik Hegemann and Martin Kahl, "(Re-)Politisierung der Sicherheit? Legitimation und Kontestation geheimdienstlicher Überwachung nach Snowden", *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 23, no. 2 (2016) 37.
[36] Pieter de Wilde, Politicisation of European Integration: Bringing the Process into Focus (Oslo: Arena, 2007), 19.
[37] de Wilde et al., "Differentiated Politicisation", 4; Grande and Hutter, "Introduction", 8.
[38] Grande and Hutter, "Introduction", 9.

controversy is not limited to diverging statements in the public sphere, but can also manifest itself in symbolic actions or protests that challenge specific views. In this sense, politicisation relates to the tradition of 'contentious politics', where scholars have intensively studied how different actors make and advance competing claims on various social and political issues.[39] They usually focus on social movements that challenge government policies, but these 'contentious interactions' might also involve additional participants from different backgrounds. Controversies can target specific political decisions, but can also attack broader political orders, including the question of which issues are to be considered political and who should decide on that. For example, critics of liberalism and neoliberalism have railed against market-favouring policies that attempt to depoliticise and naturalise iniquitous socio-economic conditions.[40]

Security is often described as being driven by an elite consensus that pushes through security measures. However, a closer look reveals that many security policies are subject to contentious and intense debates that cut across various political camps, including not only challenges to government policies but also diverging opinions among different societal groups. In many cases contested policies might not eventually change, but it is still evident that it is misleading to regard security as distinct from contentious politics and as purely controlled by political elites. A pertinent example is the debate on border security in the European Union. Like European security more broadly, observers tended to characterise border security as a rather technical issue left to specialised agencies, such as *Frontex* (now *European Border and Coast Guard Agency*), or new technological systems of border control, such as *Eurosur*.[41] Border security, however, has gained importance and political visibility since the second half of the 2000s due to increased irregular migration and the growing numbers of refugees. Especially with the recent miseries experienced by migrants crossing the Mediterranean and the political handling of this situation the attention devoted to issues of border protection rocketed to new heights. The seemingly technocratic *Frontex* became the subject of intense political criticism, both from the left and right.[42] Demands ranged from a more humane approach, and a

[39] Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Boulder: Paradigm, 2007).
[40] Burnham, "Politics of Depoliticisation"; Jenkins, "Strategies for Politicisation".
[41] Sarah Léonard, "EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices", *European Security* 19, no. 2 (2010): 231-54; Andrew Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 2 (2009): 333-56.
[42] Nina Perkowski, "Deaths, Interventions, Humanitarianism and Human Rights in the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis'", *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 2 (2016): 331-335; Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

focus on rescue missions in the Mediterranean over calls for stepped up protection of the EU's external borders, to calls for re-nationalisation in order to 'take back control'. While a range of political actors and parties, such as right-wing populists, clearly benefitted from this debate, European leaders could no longer contain the conflict within the established means of negotiation and mediation. Comparable patterns can be observed in other cases, such as debates about drone strikes or the revelations by Edward Snowden (see below).

Second, politicisation requires *mobilisation* of and awareness for an issue among a broader audience. Politicisation depends not only on the polarisation or intensity of a conflict, but also a reaching beyond narrow circles of 'usual suspects' in governments, parliaments or think tanks. Conflicts within administrations about budgets or responsibilities, for example, can be highly contentious, but they do not necessarily qualify as substantial politicisation as long as they take place behind the scenes.[43] Politicisation can manifest itself in moving issues that were previously considered to be beyond the reach of political control and debate into the realm of 'normal' and often seemingly mundane politics. For example, in many countries the work of intelligence agencies was for a long time – particularly during the Cold War – seen as a special case that was by necessity beyond the reach of parliamentary control and public responsibility. In recent years, many parliaments have created or expanded parliamentary oversight bodies or initiated inquiries.[44] However, politicisation becomes more intense when there is concrete political mobilisation by diverse actors using different forms and techniques to make and advance their claims. This can range from increased media coverage or public attention to public protests or political campaigns.[45]

This is especially important as security is often linked to governmental or technocratic prerogatives that strengthen officials and experts while marginalising the role of citizens, civil society groups, social movements and other alternative actors. When critical accounts of security examine this broader range of actors, they often limit them to a role as a more or less recalcitrant audience that may force security elites to revise, or in rare cases dismiss certain ideas and proposals, but have limited independent power to set the political agenda around security themselves.[46] Recent trends and experiences call this view into doubt. Security

[43] Andreas Kalyvas, *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[44] Hendrik Hegemann, "Toward 'Normal' Politics? Security, Parliaments and the Politicization of Intelligence Oversight in the German Bundestag", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 1 (2018): 175-90.
[45] Grande and Hutter, "Introduction", 8-9.
[46] Balzacq, "Faces of Securitization", 184-86.

concerns have been a key, and possibly decisive, issue in many recent votes, from the 'Brexit' referendum in the UK to the *Masseneinwanderungsinitiaitive* in Switzerland and elections in Netherlands, Germany or Austria. To some extent, one might argue that governing elites or populist challengers simply invoked public security needs or perceptions of 'subjective insecurity' for political gains and to hide deeper social and economic problems. However, many citizens now consider security a key issue, and they actively advance their own respective narratives that may diverge quite significantly from official security narratives.[47] Hence, the degree to and kind in which citizens and their views are involved in the policy process matters. One area where this becomes apparent is the growing inclusion of citizens and societal groups on the making of security strategies (see below).

Third, politicisation as *arena-shifting* entails the movement of issues between different types of actors and institutional and political settings, for example from technical management to ministerial decision, from executive secrecy to parliamentary deliberation, or from elite to social media discussion. This form of politicisation concerns the de- and re-politicisation moves problematised by scholars such as Peter Burnham[48] or Caroline Kuzemko,[49] which showed how British ministers attempted to divest themselves of policy area responsibility by transferring these out to technical agencies (in the case of interest rate setting, for instance), or, conversely, how media outlets, think tanks and environmental campaign groups succeeded in pushing other topics back onto policy agendas (such as in the case of national energy policy). The institutional location of issues – and thus the question of who is handling them, who has responsibility for them, and who is holding policymakers to account on them – denotes a specific 'spatial' differentiation of politicisation. It points to the circumstance that politics often draws on interconnections of different political arenas that are themselves characterised by different forms and audiences of political action, ranging from executive rule and public deliberation to judicial review and popular mobilisation. These arenas are not necessarily catering to the same audiences, and they sometimes also compete with each other. State institutions – executive governments especially – are historically in the lead in producing security as a public good, and

[47] Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, "Vernacular Security and their Study: A Qualitative Analysis and Research Agenda", *International Relations* 27, no. 2 (2013): 158-79; Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens, "Vernacular Theories of Everyday Insecurity: The Disruptive Potential of Non-Elite Knowledge", *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 40-58.
[48] Burnham, "Politics of Politicisation".
[49] Caroline Kuzemko, "Politicising UK Energy: What 'Speaking Energy Security' Can Do", *Policy & Politics* 42**,** no. 2 (2014): 259-74.

thus tend to dominate other spaces.[50] But this is not always the case, and patterns of overlay may sometimes also work in other directions.[51]

Arena shifts may be the result of manifest controversy, such as in West Germany of the 1970s and 1980s, when discontent with governmental policy crystallised in a powerful extra-parliamentary peace movement.[52] But it can also occur without obvious controversy and still be significant politically. For example, a parliamentary committee may choose to launch an independent inquiry on a (security) issue for all sorts of reasons – not only responding to public controversy, but perhaps as a routine review of how government policies are working, or because of concerns shared between interest or lobby groups and committee members.[53] Doing so on an issue not previously present in the parliament would represent an arena shift that brought an issue into public deliberation, and making parliament – a traditionally ignored arena of security politics – a place of rather 'normal' security politics, including deliberation, oversight and partisan conflict (see below). New and empowered arenas of security politics are crucial to the politicisation of security, and they can form considerably more public and controversial spaces of discussion than the executive domain. Parliaments, courts and public inquiries especially do not only aim to hold established security actors legally accountable. They can also serve as places where the security-ness of certain acts (such as ideological 'support' for terrorists) are thoroughly assessed,[54] and operate as sites for the public evaluation, (re-)negotiation and contestation of security measures and their legitimacy.[55]

The politicisation perspective sketched out above primarily accentuates the empirical study of politicisation processes along these three dimensions, but it also carries normative implications. Scholars in critical security studies have struggled with the question of which 'type of politics we want'.[56] While there has been a debate about when and how securitisation might be a desirable option, for example to mobilise all resources in situations of 'real'

---

[50] Hay, *Politics*.
[51] Jenkins, "Strategies of Depoliticisation".
[52] Friedrich Ruth, "Sicherheitspolitik der NATO: Abschreckung und Rüstungskontrolle", *Europa-Archiv* 37, no. 5 (1982): 135-144.
[53] Geddes, Marc 2019. *Dramas at Westminster: Select Committees and the Quest for Accountability,* Manchester, Manchester University Press.
[54] Sarah Klosterkamp and Paul Reuber , "Im Namen der Sicherheit" – Staatsschutzprozesse als Orte politisch-geographischer Forschung, dargestellt an Beispielen aus Gerichtsverfahren gegen Kämpfer und UnterstützerInnen der Terrororganisation „Islamischer Staat", *Geographica Helvetica* 72, no. 3 (2017): 255-269.
[55] Marieke de Goede, "Preemption Contested: Suspect Spaces and Preventability in the 7/7 Inquest", *Political Geography* 39 (March 2014): 48-57; Owen Thomas, "The Iraq Inquiries: Publicity, Secrecy and Liberal War". In *Liberal Wars: Anglo-American Strategy, Ideology and Practice*, ed. Alan Cromartie (London: Routledge, 2015), 128-149.
[56] Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene", 390.

existential threats,[57] there has been a general tendency to discard security logics because they were linked to constraints on democratic politics as discussed above. In turn, there was a general tendency to call for politicisation, whether in favour of 'normal' democratic politics of regular institutionalised procedures and public deliberation or more emancipatory versions of radical or 'agonistic' politics, which would usually require prior desecuritisation.[58] Yet, the perspective advanced in this special issue suggests that the story is more complicated than calling for 'less security, more politics'.[59] Instead of stabilising security as an incessantly exclusive kind of politics, and projecting a vision of democratic good life onto either a 'pre-securitisation' era or a 'post-securitisation' era still to come, politicisation approaches offer analytical leverage to identify ways in which pushes and pulls for inclusion in security politics already exist today – while also questioning the kinds of potentially ambivalent political orders, dynamics, and consequences that they might produce. It may well be the case that security needs some degree of 'civilisation' as a democratically controlled public good that allows for democratic control and open deliberation.[60] Yet, politicisation – or specific versions thereof – is not *per se* preferable or normatively desirable under all circumstances and in all respects; for example, those who are most insecure are often the least heard in public controversies that put their rights up for debate,[61] and so it remains open whether politicisation would best serve their needs. However, this special issue also shows that security and politics are not mutually exclusive, and that the presence of 'security' in political discourses does not necessarily shut down political contingency, activity or agency. Hence, to have a more differentiated understanding of whether and when the politicisation of security is a normatively desirable alternative or something more ambiguous we need to examine respective processes carefully with regard to their diverse forms, consequences and contexts.

---

[57] Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory", *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011), 427-39.
[58] Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene"; Hansen, "Desecuritization".
[59] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 56.
[60] Ian Loader and Neil Walker, *Civilizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[61] Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306; Paul Roe, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization", *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 279-94.

Trajectories of Politicisation: Empirical Illustrations

As is the case with established security studies frameworks, the problematisations of politicisation found in Political Science and European Studies are guided by concerns with political inclusion, contingency and transparency. Yet as the previous discussion shows, the latter offer different analytical avenues to, and thus also original empirical work on what it means to make security more widely and controversially debated. This is because apart from the question of whether security is politicised or not, it suggests a need to understand when, why and through what kinds of tactics security is made more controversial, opened to debate by different actors and shifted to different political arenas. Looking at the effects of the Snowdon revelations, forms of mobilisation in national and urban security strategy-making in Switzerland, and arena-shifting and parliamentary politics in the UK, the following mini-case studies illustrate concrete trends in the security field that a politicisation perspective can help elucidate. Foregrounding one aspect of politicisation each (full case studies would necessarily cover the evolution and interplay of all components), they lend weight to the argument that 'security' can become the subject of extensive and controversial political activity in different arenas. At the same time, they also illustrate that considerable further work is required before the analytical research heuristic set out in this special issue might be narrowed down to isolated arguments of causation.

Controversy: Snowden revelations

One of the most prominent security controversies of recent years concerns the revelations by Edward Snowden and their consequences. In June 2013, media reports, which cited Snowden as their source, started to reveal the existence of comprehensive and largely classified programs of the *US National Security Agency* (NSA) and of other Western intelligence agencies which were collecting and analysing huge volumes of private telecommunications data. Snowden's revelations kicked off a broad debate about the appropriateness of mass surveillance and the work of intelligence agencies more broadly. Media outlets around the world reported intensively. Parliaments – for example in the United States and Germany – issued reports or established committees of inquiry. Societal groups started campaigns and staged protests. Even governments engaged in more or less intense debates about the issue, as visible, for example, in the attempt to negotiate a 'No Spy' agreement

between Germany and the United States as well as in Brazil's effort to elevate the issue to the UN Security Council.

This case serves to briefly illustrate how the concept of politicisation may help us understand the political dynamics of this and other security controversies, which often go unnoticed in security and surveillance studies. The security and surveillance studies literature usually focuses on the question of how surveillance as a governing technology is used to control and manage populations and how it is able to generate a diffuse sense of implicit or explicit acceptance, or at least indifference.[62] Scholars in this field typically stress that surveillance is based on complex and largely invisible technologies, legitimised by drawing attention to salient fears of various threats and risks. In addition, many citizens have grown accustomed to handing over their personal data, which has become a common element of modern life.[63] While these approaches typically consider surveillance to be deeply political and remain critical of the governance logics that accompany it, they primarily aim to explain the surprising absence of political debate and conflict. On first view, the Snowden revelations and the debate that followed appear to confirm many of these assumptions. Public protests often focused on the 'usual suspects' of engaged civil rights advocates or online activists and the momentum for public action petered out over time. Large parts of the wider public apparently have not adapted their communication practices and with new threats of terrorism and migration rising on the political agenda reforms of intelligence agencies remained limited and in some cases even further extended the surveillance powers of intelligence agencies.

However, such a perspective tends to overlook important political dynamics that still warrant closer scrutiny. For example, the United States Congress held a number of hearings in which many top-level officials and experts had to testify on NSA surveillance practices, and President Obama commissioned a report by an independent expert committee that came to a number of critical conclusion.[64] In Germany, the Bundestag, Germany's federal parliament, established a committee of inquiry that heard 89 witnesses and published a final report of nearly 2,000 pages.[65] These practices of review and evaluation may seem rather mundane or even technocratic. However, they still provided a forum for the public debate and exchange of

[62] Lyon, Surveillance; Huysmans, "Democratic Curiosity".
[63] Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves et al., "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance", International Political Sociology 8, no. 2 (2014), 142.
[64] White House, Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 12 December 2013.
[65] Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes, 18/12850, 23 June 2017.

conflicting views on the appropriateness of surveillance and publicly unveiled important information. They featured statements from different actors representing public and private interests and made visible political conflicts, for example through dissenting views along party lines. They also forced security actors, including members of the intelligence community, to justify their actions which would otherwise hardly reach public attention.[66] Snowden and his associates released their information bit by bit and kept it on the media agenda for quite some time. Many media outlets, such as *The Guardian*, continued to report critically despite intense political pressure, which raised substantial public awareness for an otherwise rather remote issue.[67] Hence, especially during its early phase, the Snowden debate turned into a high-profile global event.

A politicisation perspective helps us draw attention to, and better understand, such security controversies. The Snowden case shows that the security field in some respects remains a hard case for political conflict and polarisation, especially when related to societal fears of terrorism or other threats, or to often invisible technologies that have become a common feature of modern societies. However, decisions and policies are not removed from the more or less 'normal' democratic politics we see in other policy fields, such as parliamentary inquiries, media reporting or public protests. Hence, we should not too easily jump to the conclusion that the field is governed by an overarching elite consensus that constrains contestation and restricts analysis to the mechanisms responsible for this. Rather, the politicisation perspective as defined above leads us to study the contentious, multi-actor processes in which different actors struggle over the interpretation of events and their consequences.

Mobilisation: Public participation in governmental security strategy-making

European security strategies offer interesting cases of politicisation around security, and help to highlight the role of mobilisation. Governmental security strategies – whether national, urban or international – are authoritative and panoramic statements about the challenges a community recognises and the programmatic responses it foresees for their handling.[68] As

[66] Matthias Schulze, "Patterns of Surveillance Legitimization: The German Discourse on the NSA Scandal", *Surveillance & Society* 13, no. 2 (2015): 197-217.
[67] David Wright and Reinhard Kreissl, *European Responses to the Snowden Revelations: A Discussion Paper* (IRISS Discussion Paper, 2013), 32-35.
[68] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Emily Goldman, "New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, no. 2 (2011): 43-76.

methodologically complex and diplomatically delicate assessments, security strategies were traditionally crafted by opaque staff units inside Defence Ministries – especially when security was still defined in military terms, and strategy thus included sensitive elements of technology, tactics and deployment. Yet their production has become significantly more inclusive and transparent since the 1990s in Europe, an observation that raises further questions about security's alleged depoliticised or depoliticising characteristics.

In Switzerland, for instance, security strategising was opened up by a sequence of different factors. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there had been a spectacular societal mobilisation around the question of what security policy ought to entail. Threat definitions escaped traditional expert circles, as an extra-parliamentary peace movement, the *Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee,* forced a national vote about the abolition of the armed forces. Although rejected, their initiative was supported by over a third of the electorate, and their strong criticism of military institutions opened doors for other groupings to participate in subsequent elaborations of security policy. By the mid-1990s, further controversies added to this process, as globalisation, European integration and the disintegration of the Eastern Block created fault-lines between internationalists and nationalists. The fundamental parameters of Swiss foreign and security policy, which historically rested on a powerful elite consensus on armed neutrality, became subject to debate in parliament and among government ministers. This was also reflected in a spate of unusually close popular votes in which right-wing politicians mobilised particularly successfully through narratives of societal insecurity.[69] By the early 2000s, finally, discussions turned less controversial in the public arena, but security began to mobilise lower levels of government, for the increasing importance of police, civil protection and migration agencies demanded inclusion of subnational competencies into the federal security domain.[70]

These dynamics helped open up governmental strategy-making processes, and thus mobilise wider groupings for the production of security strategy. This is because, as an attempt to integrate dissenting perspectives, the latter's preparation turned into an increasingly more iterative, inclusive and transparent activity. Already, the 1996 *Brunner Commission*, a government-mandated consultation committee set up 'to foster consensus view on security

[69] Kurt Spillmann, Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Marcel Gerber, *Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945: Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation* (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2001); Jonas Hagmann, "Beyond Exceptionalism? New Security Conceptions in Contemporary Switzerland", *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 2 (2010): 249-272.

[70] Jonas Hagmann, Stephan Davidshofer, Amal Tawfik, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Wildi. "The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security Field", *Swiss Political Science Review.* OnlineFirst, 4 June.

policy' – brought together 42 individuals from public administration, parliament, media, civil society and the private sector to inform the 2000 Swiss security strategy.[71] Some years later, inclusive discussions around security were built into the official formulation process itself: The 2010 national security strategy rested on broad consultation inside federal government and drew on 45 hearings with political parties, interest groups, cantonal governments, first responders, scholars and foreign experts, whose statements were transcribed and uploaded to a moderated web-platform. The public was invited to comment on the themes covered through the platform, which meant that an unprecedented large lay public was mobilised in the development of the nation's security strategy.[72] Extended stakeholder mobilisation also occurred in latest strategy process, albeit in reduced form. The development of the 2016 doctrine included 13 expert hearings (again published online).[73] The building blocks of its text were circulated among all federal ministries, cantonal governments, inter-cantonal and municipal executive (police, civil protection etc.) entities, the six largest political parties, and 19 business and civil society organisations ranging from officers' associations to unions and industry associations, all of which were invited to comment in writing. There was no online platform for citizen involvement this time, not least as public and partisan controversy on security themes had reduced by that time, but cantonal governments now mobilised strongly behind closed doors, for their contributions to national security grew substantially.[74] Mobilisation had thus shifted to yet another locus and actor category by the 2010s.

The Swiss example illustrates how security strategising can be made to rest on awareness and active, indeed strategic, engagement of increasingly complex sets of actors. It shows how evolving kinds of actors can be included in quintessential debates around security, the viability and intensity of select dangers and appropriate policy measures. Tellingly, the illustration suggests that such processes can evolve across time, and that mobilisation does not necessarily require public controversy or consequent arena-shift, such as from government to parliament. This is because the described inclusion processes remained, in fact, government-led throughout. Parliament can still only 'take note' of published strategies, as their formulation

[71] Philippe Lévy, *Edouard Brunner ou la diplomatie du possible* (Zürich: ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 2008).
[72] Daniel Möckli and Andreas Wenger. *SIPOL WEB: Öffentliche Plattform zum Sicherheitspolitischen Bericht* (Zürich: ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 2009).
[73] Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, *Bericht des Bundesrats an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz: Hearings* (Bern: VBS, 2015).
[74] Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, *Vernehmlassung zum Bericht des Bundesrates über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz: Ergebnisbericht* (Bern: VBS, 2016).

remains an executive competence. Inclusion in security politics thus remains a voluntary governmental policy-making option in Switzerland. And while such democratic experimentalism beyond conventional legitimation conduits is power-laden itself, featuring its own ambivalences and limitations – such as regarding who choses whom to consult, when, and with what effect on strategy writing and its operationalisation – its adoption and increasingly routine use does challenge close associations of security with depoliticising decisionism, expertise or technology. This holds true also elsewhere in Europe, in Spain, France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic, where similar participation frameworks have been employed.[75]

Arena-Shifting: The role of parliaments

Parliaments are increasingly active on security. As the key institutional sites of democratic politics in liberal democracies, this is significant in the context of the politicisation arguments discussed above. If parliamentary activity on security is on the rise, then how should we understand this through a politicisation lens? In fact, parliamentary security politics speaks to each of the three themes identified in this special issue: parliamentarians invariably respond to public controversies, including those concerning security such as intelligence scandals; they mobilise around issues by asking questions of the executive, setting up inquiries and calling for evidence; and they bring security issues into the public parliamentary arena that were once excluded. For example, the national parliaments of the UK, Germany, Canada and Finland amongst others have variously held votes on interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria in the past two decades, often challenging, testing and even establishing constitutional norms on executive war powers in the process.[76]

However, it is worth analytically disaggregating our three distinctions between controversy, mobilisation and arena-shifting in this case, and focusing on the significance of the latter. The insight from the British depoliticisation debate discussed earlier is that the arena

[75] Fred Tanner, Nayef Al-Rodhan and Sunjay Chandiramani, *Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009).
[76] Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel and Stefan Marschall, *Parliamentary War Powers: A Survey of 25 European Parliaments* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010). Philippe Lagassé and Patrick Mello, "The Unintended Consequences of Parliamentary Involvement: Elite Collusion and Afghanistan Deployments in Canada and Germany", *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20**,** no. 1 (2018): 135-157; James Strong, "The War Powers of the British Parliament: What Has Been Established and What Remains Unclear?", *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 20**,** no. 1 (2018): 19-34.

or location of issues matters politically; for example, outsourcing the governance of policy issues from government to technical agencies is, these scholars argue, a form of depoliticisation.[77] This parallels the argument found in securitisation theory that security removes issues from 'normal politics' and elevates them to smaller and less democratic circles of decision making.[78] Increasing parliamentary activity on security suggests a form of politicisation that reverses this process: an arena-shift of security issues into the parliamentary arena. While controversies can be a headline example of this, they do not tell the full picture. Most of the work that parliaments do is not so high profile. For example, a cursory glance at the current activities of the UK parliament reveals more than 100 on-going committee inquiries, some of which are responses to public controversy but many of which are not.[79] The titles of 15 of these explicitly relate to security as defined by the current scope of the UK national security strategy, including defence, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and humanitarian intervention.[80] If we were to dig in to the content of the rest of the inquiries, such as on migration or border management, we would likely find further security relevance. The appearance of security issues in the everyday activities of parliament is significant in the context of prevailing assumptions about executive dominance of security policy and its depoliticising effects.

The idea that this represents an 'arena-shift' of security into the parliamentary arena is clearer if we take a historical perspective. A good illustration is the work of the UK House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee, which perhaps surprisingly until the 1998 peace settlement simply did not touch anything to do with security. It held inquiries on many other policy areas, including health, agriculture, social security, transport and employment. This could be seen as the classic form of security-related depoliticisation described by the Copenhagen School: security was very much the prerogative of the state and too sensitive to be subject to open deliberation by committee. It was only well into the 2000s that the Committee began to inquire into security-related issues such as the *Omagh* bombing and the administration of an amnesty for fugitive former terrorists.[81] These issues still carried

[77] Burnham, "Politics of Depoliticisation"; Matthew Flinders and Matt Wood, "Depoliticisation, Governance and the State", *Policy & Politics,* 42**,** no. 2 (2014): 135-49.
[78] Wæver, "Politics", 469.
[79] "Select Committee inquiries A-Z", *UK Parliament,* accessed 14 June 2018. https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/inquiries-a-z/.
[80] HM Government 2010. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy.
[81] "*The Omagh Bombing: Access to Intelligence", UK Parliament*, last modified 14 July 2009, accessed 14 June 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/873/87303.htm; "Administrative Scheme for 'On-the-Runs'"*, UK Parliament*, accessed 14 June 2018,

facets of old securitisations such as a struggle with the government over access to intelligence, but they were also normalised to the degree that they could finally be discussed in the parliamentary arena. This is a case of arena shifting as a form of politicisation, in the sense that security issues have entered 'normal' parliamentary processes when they were absented before.

Conclusion

The three mini-cases studies highlight different aspects of politicisation that the articles in this special issue unpack in further detail. They show that security should not be reduced to exceptional, technocratic and/or control politics. They also show that the politicisation of issues does not simply take place in an either/or, binary fashion, but that several forms and sequences of politicisation of issues can feature across cases, and for reasons that require significant further research. This insight means that security is not *per se* opposed to democratic politics. But it does not mean jumping to conclusions that posit that security *per se* is compatible with inclusive and transparent policy-making either, or that politicisation is always the preferred option for all groups involved. Politicisation is often ambivalent and can take various forms. While the post-Snowden controversy shows how highly publicised events can spark open and controversial debates, the case studies on public inclusion and parliamentary committees revealed that politicisation can also occur through seemingly more mundane forms of everyday politics that feature an – albeit diverse – range of professional politicians, experts and advocacy groups. In turn, such forms of 'normal' politics might be effective in changing security policies and inducing new insights into the policy process, while the Snowden revelations in the long-run led to rather limited changes in actual surveillance laws and practices. Hence, this special issue remains open to the discovery of varied and ambivalent effects in the diverse politics around security.

The six contributions that follow are united by a shared interest in the differentiated examination of politicisation processes in the security field, i.e., its conceptual, empirical and normative dimensions.

First, they explore how the concept of politicisation can enrich security analysis by moving beyond established concepts, such as securitisation, emancipation or governmentality. Structured around the idea of politicisation and its dimensions, they open up new perspectives

---

https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/northern-ireland-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/administrative-scheme-for-on-the-runs/?type=Oral.

and heuristics on the politics of security. They also emphasise that the politicisation perspective needs to be adapted to specific questions and contexts. Some explore how the notion of politicisation can be fruitfully linked with further concepts, for example from science and technology studies[82] or the 'emotional turn'.[83]

Second, the articles offer further empirical examinations of specific processes of politicisation in different thematic and geographical contexts, thus catering to a deeper understanding of their forms, consequences and involved actors, and when and how they differ. To this aim, the contributors study diverse instances of politicisation, ranging from parliamentary committees in the UK[84] to feminist foreign policy agendas in Sweden[85] and discussions about Turkey's entanglement in the Syrian civil war.[86] They show that even if in many cases harsh security measures remain in place and security elites eventually prevail, this should not be confused with a stifling of political processes, which might still evolve in and between a broad range of arenas featuring a diversity of actors and arguments. Unpacking these and other often overlooked phenomena in the security field is a key benefit of the politicisation perspective, and should provoke and open up ground for further research, which is undoubtedly needed.

Third, the contributions demand more nuanced assessments of the normative quality of politicisation, for they show that the effects of politicisation should not simply be presumed and juxtaposed with the negative effects of security on an idealised version of democratic politics. Rather, they show that these linkages need to be studied and evaluated in more context-dependent ways. For instance, it is seen that human rights advocacy groups might use the international level to constrain national counterterrorism policies,[87] or that politicisation ambivalently affects debates about data protection and privacy rights.[88] However, the contributions also draw attention to cases in which the politicisation of privacy rights eventually

---

[82] Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese, "Politicizing Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity", *European Review in International Studies* (in this issue).
[83] Eric van Rythoven, "Toward Backlash: Emotion and the Politicization of Security", *European Review in International Studies* (in this issue).
[84] Andrew Neal, "Parliamentary Security Politics as Politicization by Volume", *European Review of International Studies* (in this issue).
[85] Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, *European Review of International Studies* (in this issue).
[86] Pinar Bilgin, "Forestalling Politicization: Securitization and Sacralization in Turkey", *European Review of International Studies* (in this issue).
[87] Fiona de Londras, "Politicisation, Law and Rights in the Transnational Counter-Terrorism Space: Indications from the Regulation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters",*European Review of International Studies* (in this issue).
[88] Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese, "Politicizing Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity", *European Review in International Studies* (in this issue).

led to harsher encroachments upon these rights,[89] or cases in which authorities explicitly tried to forestall politicisation by *not* using security, while societal actors seeking to politicise the issue employed a security framing to put responsibility on the government.[90] Taken together, the six articles thus make sophisticated contributions to the aims of this special issue set out in this introduction. Their nuanced analyses help open up an empirically and analytically rich new research focus on the politicisation of security, its controversy, patterns of mobilisation, and shifting across arenas. In so doing, they also help question and re-visit one of the core concerns in contemporary security studies: the evolving relations between politics and security.

[89] Dunn Cavelty and Leese, "Privacy".
[90] Bilgin, „Sacralization"

References

Aradau, Claudia. "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7, no. 4 (2004): 388-413. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800030

Aradau, Claudia, and Rens van Munster. "Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future." *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 89-115. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074290

Balzacq, Thierry. ed. *Contesting Security. Strategies and Logics*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Balzacq, Thierry. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agenda, Audience and Context." *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960

Bauman, Zygmunt, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, and R.B.J. Walker. "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance." *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 2 (2014): 121-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12048

Bigo, Didier. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27 (2002): 64-92. https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105

Browning, Christopher S., and Matt McDonald. "The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 2 (2013): 235-55. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111419538

Burnham, Peter. "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2001): 127–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.00054

Burstein, Paul and William Freudenberg. "Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Antiwar Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions", *American Journal of Sociology* 84, no. 11 (1978): 99-122. https://doi.org/10.1086/226742

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

De Goede, Marieke. "Preemption Contested: Suspect Spaces and Preventability in the 7/7 Inquest." *Political Geography* 39 (2014): 48-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.08.001

De Goede, Marieke. *Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Money*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816675890.001.0001

De Wilde, Pieter. "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration." *Journal of European Integration* 33, no. 5 (2011): 559-75. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2010.546849

De Wilde, Pieter. *Politicisation of European Integration: Bringing the Process into Focus*. Oslo: ARENA, 2007.

De Wilde, Pieter, Anna Leupold, and Henning Schmidtke. "Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance." *West European Politics* 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1081505

Deutscher Bundestag. *Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes*. 18/12850. 23 June 2017.

Dieterich, Sandra, Hartwig Hummel, and Stefan Marschall. *Parliamentary War Powers: A Survey of 25 European Parliaments*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010.

Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport. *Vernehmlassung zum Bericht des Bundesrates über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz: Ergebnisbericht*. Bern: VBS, 2016.

Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport. *Bericht des Bundesrats an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz: Hearings*. Bern: VBS, 2015.

Fawcett, Paul, and David Marsh. "Depoliticisation, Governance and Political Participation." *Policy & Politics* 42 (2014): 171-188. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557313X13868593346016

Fierke, Karen. *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Second Edition. Cambridge: Polity, 2015).

Flinders, Matthew, and Jim Buller. "Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools." *British Politics* 1, no. 3 (2006): 293-318. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.bp.4200016

Flinders, Matthew, and Matt Wood. "Depoliticisation, Governance and the State." *Policy & Politics,* 42 (2014): 135-149. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557312X655873

Floyd, Rita. "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011), 427-39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418712

Geddes, Marc 2019. *Dramas at Westminster: Select Committees and the Quest for Accountability*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Goldman, Emily. "New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, no. 2 (2011): 43-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390108565554

Grande, Edgar, and Swen Hutter. "Introduction: European Integration and the Challenge of Politicisation." In *Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics*, edited by Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi, 3-31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316422991.002

Hagmann, Jonas. "Security in the Society of Control: The Politics and Practices of Securing Urban Spaces." *International Political Sociology* 11, no. 4 (2017): 418-448. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olx020

Hagmann, Jonas. *(In)security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe*. London, Routledge, 2015.

Hagmann, Jonas. "Representations of Terrorism and the Making of Counterterrorism Policy". *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 3 (2013): 429-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2013.836306

Hagmann, Jonas. "Beyond Exceptionalism? New Security Conceptions in Contemporary Switzerland." *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 2 (2010): 249-272. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2010.491367

Hagmann, Jonas, Stephan Davidshofer, Amal Tawfik, Andreas Wenger, and Lisa Wildi. "The Programmatic and Institutional (Re-)Configuration of the Swiss National Security Field." *Swiss Political Science Review*. OnlineFirst, 4 June.

Hagmann, Jonas, and Myriam Dunn Cavelty. "National Risk Registers: Security Scientism and the Propagation of Permanent Insecurity." *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 1 (2012): 80-97. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611430436

Hansen, Lene. "Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It." *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 4 (2011): 525-546.

Hansen, Lene. "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School." *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501

Hardt, Michael. "The Global Society of Control." *Discourse* 20, no. 3 (1998): 139-152.

Hartley, Thomas Hartley Russett. "Public Opinion and the Common Defence: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?" *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 4 (1992): 905-915. https://doi.org/10.2307/1964343

Hay, Colin. *Why We Hate Politics*. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

Hegemann, Hendrik. "Toward 'Normal' Politics? Security, Parliaments and the Politicization of Intelligence Oversight in the German Bundestag." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 1 (2018): 175-90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745683

Hegemann, Hendrik and Martin Kahl. "(Re-)Politisierung der Sicherheit? Legitimation und Kontestation geheimdienstlicher Überwachung nach Snowden." *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 23, no. 2 (2016): 7-41. https://www.doi.org/10.5771/0946-7165-2016-2-6

HM Government. *"A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy."* London: HM Government, 2010.

Howell, William G. and John C. Pevehouse. *While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400840830

Hudson, Hudson. "Doing Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Security." *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 2 (2005): 155-74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605054642

Huysmans, Jef. "Democratic Curiosity in Times of Surveillance." *European Journal of International Security* 1, no. 1 (2016): 73-93. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2015.2

Huysmans, Jef. *Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits*. London: Routledge, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315817248

Jarvis, Lee, and Michael Lister. "Vernacular Securities and their Study: A Qualitative Analysis and Research Agenda." *International Relations* 27, no. 2 (2013): 158-79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117812460880

Jenkins, Laura. "The Difference Genealogy Makes: Strategies for Politicisation or How to Expand Capacities for Autonomy." *Political Studies* 59, no. 1 (2013): 156-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00844.x

Jessop, Bob. "Repoliticising Depoliticisation: Theoretical Preliminaries on Some Responses to the American Fiscal and Eurozone Debt Crises." *Policy & Politics* 42 (2014): 207-223. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557312X655864

Kalyvas, Andreas. *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary : Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755842

Klosterkamp, Sarah, and Paul Reuber. 2017. "'Im Namen der Sicherheit': Staatsschutzprozesse als Orte politisch-geographischer Forschung, dargestellt an Beispielen aus Gerichtsverfahren gegen Kämpfer und UnterstützerInnen der Terrororganisation 'Islamischer Staat'". *Geographica Helvetica* 72, no. 3 (2017): 255-269. https://doi.org/10.5194/gh-72-255-2017

Kriesi, Hanspeter. "The Politicization of European Integration". *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (Annual Review 2016): 32-47.

Kuzemko, Caroline. "Politicising UK Energy: What 'Speaking Energy Security' Can Do." *Policy & Politics* 42 (2014)**:** 259-274. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557312X655990

Lagassé, Philippe, and Patrick A. Mello. "The Unintended Consequences of Parliamentary Involvement: Elite Collusion and Afghanistan Deployments in Canada and Germany." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20**,** no. 1 (2018): 135-157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745681

Léonard, Sarah. "EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices." *European Security* 19, no. 2 (2010): 231-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526937

Lévy, Philippe. La commission d'étude pour les questions stratégiques ("Commission Brunner" 1996-1998): *Edouard Brunner ou la diplomatie du possible*. Zürich: ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 133-139.

Loader, Ian, and Neil Walker. *Civilizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611117

Lyon, David. *Surveillance after Snowden*. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

Mello, Patrick A. and Dirk Peters. "Parliaments in Security Policy: Involvement, Politicisation, and Influence." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 20**,** no. 1 (2018): 3-18. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745684

Möckli, Daniel, and Andreas Wenger. *SIPOL WEB: Öffentliche Plattform zum Sicherheitspolitischen Bericht*. Zürich, ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 2009.

Neal, Andrew. "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 2 (2009): 333-356. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00807.x

Perkowski, Nina. "Deaths, Interventions, Humanitarianism and Human Rights in the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis'." *Mediterranean Politics,* 21, no. 2 (2016): 331-35. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1145827

Posen, Barry. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Roe, Paul. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization." *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (2004): 279-94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604047527

Ruth, Friedrich. "Sicherheitspolitik der NATO: Abschreckung und Rüstungskontrolle." *Europa-Archiv* 37, no. 5 (1982): 135-144.

Schulze, Matthias. "Patterns of Surveillance Legitimization: The German Discourse on the NSA Scandal." *Surveillance & Society* 13, no. 2 (2015): 197-217. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i2.5296

Spillmann, Kurt, Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser, and Marcel Gerber. *Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945: Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation*. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2001.

Stritzel, Holger. "Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond." *European Journal of International Relations* 13. No. 3 (2007): 357-383. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107080128

Strong, James. "The War Powers of the British Parliament: What Has Been Established and What Remains Unclear?" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20**,** no. 1 (2018): 19-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745767

Tanner, Fred, Nayef Al-Rodhan, and Sunjay Chandiramani. *Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009.

Thomas, Owen. "The Iraq Inquiries: Publicity, Secrecy and Liberal War." In *Liberal Wars: Anglo-American Strategy, Ideology and Practice*, edited by Alan Cromartie, 128-49. London: Routledge, 2015. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315732978-7

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder: Paradigm, 2007.

UK Parliament. "*The Omagh Bombing: Access to Intelligence."* Last modified 14 July 2009. Accessed 14 June 2018. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/873/87303.htm.

UK Parliament. "Administrative Scheme for 'On-the-Runs'." Accessed 14 June 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/northern-ireland-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/administrative-scheme-for-on-the-runs/?type=Oral.

UK Parliament. "*Select Committee Inquiries A-Z*." Accessed 14 June 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/inquiries-a-z/.

Vaughan-Williams, Nick. *Europe's Border Crisis. Biopolitical Security and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747024.001.0001

Vaughan-Williams, Nick, and Daniel Stevens. "Vernacular Theories of Everyday Insecurity. The Disruptive Potential of Non-Elite Knowledge." *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 40-58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615604101

Villumsen Berling, Trine. "Science and Securitization: Objectivation, The Authority of the Speaker and Mobilization of Scientific Facts." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 385-397. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418714

Walt, Stephen M. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991)**:** 211-239. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471

Wæver, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wæver, Ole. “Politics, Security, Theory.” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 465-80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418718

White House. “*Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies”*. 12 December 2013 accessed 14 June 2018. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.

Williams, Michael. “Securitization as Political Theory: The Politics of the Extraordinary.” *International Relations* 29, no. 1 (2015): 114-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606c

Wight, Martin. "Why Is There No International Theory?" In *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, edited by James Der Derian, 15-35. London: Macmillan, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23773-9_2

Wright, Wright, and Reinhard Kreissl*, European Responses to the Snowden Revelations: A Discussion Paper* (IRISS Discussion Paper, 2013).

Wolfers, Arnold. “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol.” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 481-502. https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138

Wood, Matthew. “Politicisation, Depoliticisation and Anti-politics: Towards a Multilevel Research Agenda.” *Political Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2016): 521-533. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12074

Wood, Matt, and Matthew Flinders. “Rethinking Depoliticisation: Beyond the Governmental.” *Policy & Politics* 42 (2014)**:** 151-70.

Zürn, Michael. “The Politicization of World Politics and its Effects: Eight Propositions.” *European Political Science Review* 6, no. 1 (2014): 47-71. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000276